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Abstract: Even if we identify the goals of normative theories of argumentation with the goals of a theory of
justification, we can either focus on the conditions for considering that a target-claim is justified, or on
characterizing justification from the point of view of the practice of arguing. I analyze the rewards and shortcomings
of both views and their corresponding criteriological and transcendental accounts of the sort of objectivity that good
argumentation is able to provide.
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1. Introduction
Is arguing well always something reasonable, rational or justified? I would like to answer this
question by considering two ways of thinking of the relationship between argumentation and
reasonableness/ rationality/ justification that mirror two very different views about what a theory
of argumentation should look like.
Most argumentation theorists take their task to be that of providing models to evaluate
argumentation as regards its reasonableness, rationality or justificatory power. For them,
reasonableness, rationality and justification are semantic primitives, unexplained explainers that
work as standards for argumentative goodness: argumentation is said to be good only if it is
deemed to be reasonable, rational or justified according to one or another set of criteria. This is,
for example, the view of authors within the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory,
who contend that good argumentation is argumentation that, in fulfilling certain epistemic
conditions, makes belief in its conclusion (epistemically) rational or justified. It is also the view
of Pragma-dialectics, which takes good argumentation to be (procedurally) reasonable, inasmuch
it fulfils certain procedural conditions, or the view of the virtue approach to Argumentation
Theory, which takes good argumentation to be argumentation conducted virtuously, so that it
justifies belief in its conclusion. So understood, Argumentation Theory would be the task of
putting together all that we know about ways of reasoning that have proven to be safe, in the
sense of warranting, one way or another, its outcome. I will call this the criteriological
conception of Argumentation Theory.
Yet, it is also possible to think of Argumentation Theory as the endeavour of
characterizing reasonableness, rationality and justification themselves. On this view,
reasonableness, rationality and justification would be neither semantic primitives, nor standards
for argumentation goodness, but the very outcome of arguing well. For to say of something that
it is reasonable, justified or rational is to say that there are good reasons for it, and on this view,
this can only mean that there is good argumentation for it. Good argumentation, and only good
argumentation, would justify and make our claims rational or reasonable and, by extension, also
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our beliefs, actions, decisions, attitudes, etc. On this view, things do not stand justified, rational
or reasonable on their own, but only in virtue of there being good argumentation for them.
Of course, as a proposal within Argumentation Theory, this approach cannot take
argumentation goodness as a semantic primitive. And in thinking of normative concepts such as
justification, rationality or reasonableness as essentially argumentative, the approach is
committed to look for the normative conditions of argumentation in the very practice of arguing.
From this perspective, the main question for a theory of argumentation would be something like
“does this piece of argumentation count as good argumentation, taking into account the
conception of argumentative value that makes sense of arguing as an activity?” So understood,
Argumentation Theory would be the philosophical task of characterizing the normative activity
of arguing and its underlying conception of argumentation goodness; and this transcendental
conception of Argumentation Theory would be called to play a central role within epistemology,
theories of rationality, and any other field in which normative concepts such as justification,
rationality, reasons or reasonableness are pivotal.
The goal of this paper is to analyze the rewards and shortcomings of these conceptions of
Argumentation Theory and their corresponding accounts of the sort of objectivity that good
argumentation is able to provide.
2. Rationality, justification and reasonableness from a criteriological perspective
Argumentation Theory is a normative endeavour at least in the following sense: argumentation
theorists aim at providing tools to tell good argumentation from bad argumentation. But the task
of warranting our intuitions about what is good (or bad) argumentation is not easy. The usual
strategy is to contend that argumentation has an idiosyncratic goal, so that those pieces of
argumentation that achieve this goal are said to have intrinsic value and therefore count as good
argumentation.
The hallmark of the epistemological approach to Argumentation Theory is to deal with
argumentative normativity in epistemological terms. The core idea is that arguments aim at the
achievement of knowledge or at least of justified belief (Siegel and Biro 1997, p. 278), so that
good argumentation is characterized as argumentation that provides justification (Biro 1987, p.
69; Biro and Siegel 1992, p. 96; Goldman 2003, p. 58).
But to be true, this plea for justification does not quite help in discriminating a particular
proposal within the field. For it is not just those theories adopting an epistemological approach,
but every theory within the field, that is committed to a principled distinction between good
argumentation and bad argumentation, and to the corresponding conception of an argumentative
intrinsic value. This way, whatever makes the difference, in each of these theories, between good
argumentation and argumentation that falls short of being good, can be said to amount to what
these theories take to be argumentation providing justification, rationality or reasonableness, be it
argumentation solving a difference of opinion on the merits, or argumentation able to persuade a
universal audience, or argumentation producing rational persuasion, or argumentation conducted
virtuously, etc.
Of course, there are important differences between theories adopting an epistemological
approach and theories adopting dialectical, rhetorical or virtue approaches. Particularly,
dialectical, rhetorical and virtue theories of argumentation tend to avoid terms such as
‘rationality’ and ‘justification’ in favour of others such as ‘reasonableness’. But their point as
models within Argumentation Theory is to determine what makes argumentation intrinsically
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good, and not merely successful. So understood, any theory of argumentation would consist of a
set of criteria for warranting the quality of the outcome of those pieces of argumentation that
satisfy them, according to one or another conception of the goal that, allegedly, we pursue when
we argue.
Authors within the epistemological approach have tried to stand out by insisting on two
further ideas: on the one hand, that good argumentation turns belief in its conclusion rational,
and on the other hand, that good argumentation makes its conclusion more likely (Lumer 2005,
pp. 213-214; Goldman 2003, p. 62). However, this is, again, something that any other theory
within the field may subscribe: pragma-dialecticians, for example, could say both that it is
reasonable to believe the conclusion of a piece of argumentation that meets the standards of a
critical discussion, and that this is so because it is more likely to have true beliefs, or at least
beliefs closer to truth, by following the rules of a critical discussion than by violating them.1 In
this respect, the attempt to demarcate epistemic proposals from theories such as Pragmadialectics by pointing out that the function of argumentation is to reach knowledge (or justified
belief) rather than consensus would be flawed: consensus would be just a further criterion to say
that the outcome is warranted –i.e., justified, rational or reasonable. And much the same could be
said of virtue theories of argumentation: the fact that arguers are virtuous indeed speaks in favour
of their argumentation and, in principle, makes belief in their conclusions rational and justified
(Aberdein 2007).
3. Problems with the criteriological conception of Argumentation Theory
So, theories such as Pragma-dialectics, virtue argumentation theory, and those within the
epistemological approach would share the strategy of determining argumentation goodness by
providing sets of criteria to warrant that argumentation that satisfies these criteria achieves the
type of value that, allegedly, is the sort of thing that we argue for –namely, the justification,
rationality or reasonableness of its outcome. Regarding the epistemological approach, Lumer
says:
[a]n epistemological theory of argument is characterized by two features. 1. It
takes the standard function of arguments to be: to lead the argument’s addressee
to (rationally) justified belief, i.e., to guide him to realize the truth or acceptability
of the argument’s thesis – where ‘acceptability’ is intended to be a broader term,
meaning truth, high probability or verisimilitude. 2. It develops criteria for good
arguments and argumentation on this basis, i.e., it designs them in such a way as
to fulfil their epistemic function. (Lumer 2005, pp. 213-214).
I would like to show now that this general strategy is problematic. I will focus on the
epistemological approach because of its adamant use of normative standards, but my contention
is that the following quandaries apply in similar ways to any proposal within Argumentation
Theory that adopts this criteriological strategy.
One of the first things that we may wonder about models based on criteria for
argumentation goodness is: where do these criteria come from? Are they empirical rules of
thumb that have proven reliable means to avoid falsity over time, or are they more constitutively
1

For Pragma-dialectics, truth is not a requirement of good argumentation, but because of its endorsement of
Popper’s critical-rationalism, it can be said to constitute the ultimate goal of a critical discussion.
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tied to truth –as for example, the rules of logic? How should we justify the rules for determining
justification? As Hilary Putnam taught us, this is a tricky question that pervades all those areas of
philosophy that pivot on normative concepts. In his account, this question poses the following
trilemma: either refusing the possibility of justifying models for determining what is justified, or
trying to justify them, by appealing either to subsequent normative models – which is a strategy
doomed to initiate an infinite regress – or to the very model that we try to justify – which is a
viciously circular strategy (Putnam 1981, pp. 103-126).
Pragma-dialectics has at least made some attempt to justify its rules for determining
argumentation goodness by considering the problem-solving effectiveness and the
intersubjective acceptability of the procedural rules that sanction critical discussions (van
Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, pp. 123-157). The idea is that these rules are supposed to be
instrumental in solving differences of opinion on the merits. Yet, there is no further attempt to
explain what does it mean “on the merits,” or to show that these rules are sufficient to warrant
the outcomes of the procedures that play by them, or to show that each of these rules is necessary
for a warranted outcome. In turn, within the epistemological approach, only Goldman and Lumer
have actually proposed (incomplete) sets of epistemic principles whose justification would come
from the fact that, allegedly, they are efficient in the sense that, by following them, we get at
acceptable beliefs. Again, in Lumer’s words:
What is important, though, (…) is to underline the necessity and existence of clear
and efficient, epistemologically justified truth definitions and criteria as well as
procedures for cognizing the truth and the criteria for good argumentation based
on them. Only this can cut off the seemingly eternal general objection that some
people believe this, other people believe that, where the relevant question is:
Which belief is justified? And here a big research task is still waiting for the
champions of the epistemological approach, namely to enlarge and further
elaborate the arsenal of such epistemologically justified instruments (Lumer 2005,
p. 192)
Basically, the criteriological strategy for justifying rules for justification is to point out
that we should follow them because, allegedly, they would warrant the achievement of the goals
that, allegedly again, we pursue when we argue – like getting knowledge, or solving differences
of opinion on the merits, or persuading a rational or a universal audience. But, what if we do not
pursue such goals? What would be wrong with arguing without pursuing the resolution of a
difference of opinion, or even without pursuing knowledge? Even if it is true that argumentation
has an idiosyncratic goal, why are we obliged to pursue that goal when we argue? And why
should we pursue it by following rules that have not been shown to be individually necessary and
collectively sufficient to achieve it? Why arguing that way is arguing intrinsically well?
Actually, the characterization of argumentation goodness as argumentation that gives us
reasons to believe the truth of the conclusion (Biro and Siegel 2006, p. 94), or that, at least, “that
makes belief in its conclusion justified” (Feldman 1994, p. 176) seems to pose two further
problems for the epistemic approach. For, on the one hand, such characterization is incoherent: a
very bad argumentation whose conclusion is that the arguer is not a good arguer would give us
reason to believe so and would make belief in its conclusion justified and rational; yet, by
definition, it would be bad argumentation that gives us reason to believe so.
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On the other hand, this characterization of good argumentation is open to a particular
version of the wrong kind of reasons problem. This problem results from the vagueness of
thinking of a reason for something as a consideration that counts in its favour (Hieronymi 2005).
If by producing a particular piece of argumentation, whether good or bad, it happens to be the
case that someone’s life depends on our believing the conclusion, then this argumentation gives
us a good reason to believe the conclusion (and it makes it rational, reasonable and justified to
believe it); yet, it seems to be a reason of the wrong kind.
As we are going to see in the sec. 5, these problems have to do with the fact that the very
concept of (good) reason (as well as those of justification, reasonableness and rationality) is not
only normative, but also essentially argumentative, and because of that, it cannot work as a
standard to characterize argumentation goodness in turn.
4. The internal and the external assessment of argumentation
Arguing is a kind of doing, and as such, it is something that can be rational or irrational (or
justified/unjustified or reasonable/unreasonable) to do depending on the circumstances and the
goals that we pursue. Let me call this way of appraising argumentation its external assessment.
From this external perspective, it makes sense to question whether or not arguing is a rational
(reasonable or justified) thing to do in the circumstances, and even whether or not it is rational
(or reasonable or justified) to pursue the goals that we characteristically pursue when we argue.
When we externally assess a piece of argumentation, we consider things such as whether or not it
was a good idea to adduce this and that to this particular audience, or even whether or not it was
a good idea to argue at all in the circumstances. From such external perspective, the value of
argumentation is a matter of its effectiveness as a means to a variety of possible ends.
On the other hand, arguing is also a means to determine the rationality (or reasonableness,
or justification) of our claims, beliefs, decisions, attitudes, etc. From this internal perspective, the
assessment of argumentation is the task of determining its intrinsic value. As it may become
evident now, the problem of the criteriological theories described above is that they conflate the
two types of assessments: by positing that argumentation goodness – that is, argumentation that
has intrinsic value – is argumentation that serves to achieve one or another – allegedly
characteristic – goal, these theories deal with the internal assessment of argumentation in terms
of an external type of assessment. In the end, the criteriological conception of Argumentation
Theory endorses an instrumental conception of argumentative value; and as a result, the
normativity of its rules is cast in doubt, as they happen to be merely conditional on the goals that
we may pursue when we argue.
Certainly, argumentation is a type of communication among others, and not necessarily
the most efficient one as regards the achievement of the typical goals of communication –such as
expressing mental states and influencing others. In principle, making promises or threats,
rallying, sweet-talking, bargaining, etc. may be better means to our communicative goals.
Nonetheless, argumentation is a very special type of communication because, in arguing for our
claims, we can make them rational, we can justify them and, thus, we can persuade others of
them “in a rational way.”
The fact that argumentation is not only a means of influence but also a means to
determine the rationality (or reasonableness, or justification) of our claims, beliefs, decisions,
attitudes, etc. explains that the external assessment of argumentation involves an intrinsic
reference to legitimacy: by arguing well for our points of view (about what is the case or what
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we should do), we show them to be correct. In this respect, argumentation is very different not
only from mere assertions, but also from any other form of interaction in which elements
external to the very elucidation of the matter could force the acquiescence of our hearers.
Thus, we can say that, in general, the external value of argumentation as a means of
influence comes from its internal value as a means to show that what we say is as we say that it
is: arguing happens to be a powerful tool for persuasion because we all know that it is also a
powerful epistemic tool, a means to get true beliefs and right decisions. In the end, this is the
reason why we trust in argumentation as, for example, a means to solve disagreements.
5. Revisiting the wrong kind of reasons problem: practical vs. epistemic reasons
Because of their instrumental conception of argumentation goodness, criteriological approaches
to Argumentation Theory do not adequately deal with the difference between the external
assessment of a piece of argumentation, i.e., the task of determining its value as a means to an
end, and its internal assessment, i.e., the task of determining its intrinsic value, which, as pointed
out before, is a matter of argumentation’s ability to justify our beliefs and claims.
But what does it mean to say that argumentation is a means to justify our beliefs and
claims? I would like to show now that the distinction between the external assessment of
argumentation and its internal assessment mirrors the distinction between practical reasons and
epistemic reasons, and that this correspondence explains why, in conflating the two types of
assessment, epistemic approaches are bound to the problems pointed out in sec. 3.
In principle, we can have good reasons for beliefs and claims, and our beliefs and claims
can be rational, reasonable or justified, not only on epistemic grounds, but also pragmatically: if I
want my kids to be careful, I may have a good reason to tell them that the river is dangerous –
whether it actually is or not; and if I want to calm my nerves in a presentation, I may have good
reason to believe that I am not boring – whether I actually am or not. These are practical reasons
in that they are reasons for doing something, and they are normally good or bad depending on the
goals that we have. Believing and claiming can be seen as kinds of doings, and in principle, we
can have practical reasons for them.
What is, then, a theoretical or epistemic reason? It cannot be just a consideration that
counts in favour of asserting or holding a doxastic attitude, because, as we have seen, we can
have practical reasons for that. Nor can it be a reason for an epistemic goal, such as having
knowledge or true beliefs, because that would imply that when we pursue true beliefs, we have,
not a practical, but an epistemic reason to take the magic pill of truth.
So, let me suggest this definition: if a practical (good) reason is a reason that justifies
intentional things such as actions, decisions, etc, then an epistemic (good) reason is a reason that
justifies representational things such as beliefs, assertions, etc. Thus, an epistemic reason for p
would not justify (or make it rational or reasonable) believing or asserting that p but the belief or
the assertion that p.
This account of epistemic reasons may sound a bit funny. Not in vain, the traditional
characterization of reasons as “considerations that count in favour of…” has obscured the
distinction between practical and epistemic reasons for centuries: for, what can it mean “counting
in favour,” if not “counting in favour of doing something”? What can it mean “counting in
favour of a representation”? And what can it mean “justifying a representation” or “rendering it
rational or reasonable”? I am going to offer an answer to these qualms in the following section.
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But by now, I would like just to point out that the expressions “consideration” and “counting in
favour” are too vague to define the concept of reason.2
Actually, as pointed out before, from the perspective of a transcendental conception of
Argumentation Theory, the ontogenesis of reasons is essentially argumentative, and this is
something that the traditional definition does not quite get. Particularly, from this perspective
epistemic reasons are, precisely, the sort of reasons that good argumentation provides for its
conclusion: they justify the conclusion, not the “action” of believing or asserting it.
Neglecting the distinction between practical and epistemic reasons is the (explanatory)
reason why, in contending that good argumentation is argumentation that gives us reason – or
justifies or makes it rational – believing its conclusion, the epistemic approach is bounded to the
problems mentioned in sec. 3: for, on the one hand, it makes it possible that bad argumentation
gives us reason to believe the conclusion, and on the other hand, it makes it possible that good
argumentation gives us reasons of the wrong kind to believe the conclusion. Why is this so?
Because good argumentation does not give us (practical) reasons for believing, unless we pursue
knowledge or rational beliefs. After all, at times, it may make perfect sense to refuse the good
advice of a friend who tries to persuade us of not doing something, or the explanations of a
physician about how poor our condition is. Yet, good argumentation necessarily gives us good
reasons for our beliefs because, basically, good argumentation consists of good epistemic
reasons. In other words, giving good reasons for believing that p is not the same as rendering
justified the belief that p. Yet, this is precisely (all) what good argumentation is able to do.
6. A proposal within the transcendental conception of Argumentation Theory
As pointed out before, from a transcendental perspective, (good) reasons, justification, rationality
and reasonableness are not semantic primitives, but concepts that spring from the very practice
of arguing. Basically, the idea is that argumentation is constitutively normative: it is a practice
with constitutive correctness conditions, like that of making assertions or holding beliefs. Thus,
if the constitutive correctness conditions of asserting come from the fact that whatever counts as
an assertion counts as an attempt at saying how things are, the constitutive correctness conditions
of arguing come from the fact that whatever counts as argumentation counts as an attempt at
justifying a claim. On this view, justification is not the idiosyncratic goal of argumentation, but
its constitutive goal, because there is no argumentation if there is no attempt at justifying; and
argumentation actually providing justification for its conclusion would be argumentation
intrinsically good.3
From the perspective of the transcendental conception of Argumentation Theory, a
normative model for argumentation is nothing but a description of argumentation as a practice
with constitutive correctness conditions. In Bermejo-Luque (2011) I offered one such type of
proposal: i.e., a linguistic normative model of argumentation. This model characterizes
argumentation as a speech act that counts as an attempt at showing that a target-claim is correct.
Correspondingly, in LNMA, (epistemically) justifying is adducing reasons showing a target2

I have argued in more detail for an argumentative conception of reasons in Bermejo-Luque (2015).
That the normativity of argumentation is constitutive does not imply that we cannot argue badly: I count as arguing
if I count as trying to justify a claim; yet, I may try it but not succeed in it. However, given the fact that in order to
count as arguing I must count as trying to justify, I cannot argue (because I cannot count as arguing) if I argue badly
in a deliberate and ostensible manner. In other words, in responding to a criticism “so what? I don’t care if it follows
or not,” we make clear to our addressees that what we do is no longer argumentation.
3
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claim to be correct – and this is something that involves semantic conditions determining the
correctness of a claim and pragmatic conditions determining how good is an act of arguing as an
act of showing.
In this account, the epistemic rationality, justification or reasonableness of a belief that p
is a matter of there being good reasons for p, and this is, in turn, a matter of there being
argumentation actually showing the claim that p to be correct. In turn, the practical rationality,
justification or reasonableness of an action f would be a matter of there being good reasons for fing, and this is, in turn, a matter of there being argumentation actually showing that the claim
that f must/should/could/etc. be done is correct. So understood, practical justification would stem
from epistemic justification.
Remarkably, in this account things do not stand justified, rational or reasonable by their
own, but they acquire this status if and only if there is good reasons – and therefore, good
argumentation – for them. Of course, without argumentation we could still have true beliefs and
make right decisions, but only argumentation enables us to justify them, in the sense of showing
their correctness.
7. Conclusions: Argumentation Theory and the search for objectivity
Through this paper, I have tried to show that it is possible to think of Argumentation Theory
either as a sort of “applied epistemology” or as a conceptual endeavour. The former is the option
of those defending a criteriological conception of the discipline. Their goal is to offer criteria to
warrant our assertions and beliefs. Contrastingly, the goal of a transcendental conception of
Argumentation Theory is to characterize argumentation as a normative activity and, as a result,
to give an account of the normative conditions that constitute it.
In a way, advocates of a criteriological perspective see themselves as fighting against
scepticism. This is why they think that we cannot accept as a condition of argumentation
goodness the semantic correctness of the claims that we put forward in arguing: that would be to
beg the question against the sceptic. Instead of that, they put as criteria of good argumentation
things such as the condition that “a speaker should assert a premise only if she is justified in
believing it,” and that “a speaker should assert a premise only if she thinks she is justified in
believing it”, or the condition that the arguer is virtuous, or the condition that parties do not
impede each other to raise questions, etc.
Yet, for an advocate of the transcendental conception, this fight against scepticism is
alien to a proper theory of argumentation. From this perspective, a theory of argumentation
should not aim to be a theory of all: its goal is not to offer criteria to determine which claims are
true, likely or close to truth. Actually, this is the business of argumentation itself. Rather, the
goal of a theory of argumentation would be to explain what is arguing, and which concept of
good argumentation underlies argumentation as a normative practice, in order to provide not only
a normative model of argumentation, but also an account of normative concepts such as
justification, rationality, reasons and reasonableness, as emanating from the very practice of
arguing.
As regards truth attributions, an advocate of the transcendental conception just records
that arguers behave all the time as if they had access to truth and knowledge: this is exactly what
they do when they make assertions and hold beliefs. Maybe, in the end, we can never be sure of
our truth attributions; but this doesn’t really matter. For we keep making assertions and holding
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beliefs, and arguing for them by adducing reasons and rendering them rational and justified.
Actually, regarding our epistemic goals, this is all that we can do.4
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Remarkably, from this point of view, it is possible to supersede the debate between advocates of a subjective
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that we argue as if we had access to truths and, thus, as if we could get at objectively justified beliefs; after all, this is
what we do when we make any of the assertions that a piece of argumentation consists of: the “objective duty” is
constitutive of arguing. Yet, we can only assess argumentation by assessing the correctness of such assertions; and
this is always something that we do from a subjective point of view.
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